is based on the male breadwinner model. 2 The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has made strides in dismantling the male bias in the ICESCR through an evolutionary interpretation, 3 and it is working towards engendering socio-economic rights. 4 This process, however, is only just beginning, and much remains to be done.
Up until this point, the focus has been on reshaping the normative content of socio-economic rights so that the ICESCR better responds to women's experiences. 5 Less attention has been paid in developing monitoring tools to assess if the state has fulfilled its obligations under Article 2(2) and Article 3 of the ICESCR. Without explicitly considering the state's implementation of women's socio-economic rights, there is a real risk that gender inequalities will remain invisible. Achieving gender equality is complex. Measures designed to promote women's socio-economic rights can perpetuate, in effect, gender stereotypes or re-entrench disadvantage. It is imperative to carefully evaluate the implementation of women's socio-economic rights. 6 This article asks: what monitoring standards need to be reformed or developed by the CESCR to ensure that women are equally able to enjoy their socio-economic rights? As the global community embarks on realizing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include achieving gender equality and empowerment for all women and girls (SDG-5), this question becomes even more pertinent. International human rights accountability fora have untapped the potential to contribute to realizing the ambitious aims of the SDGs. Considering how the CESCR can effectively monitor compliance for the implementation of women's socio-economic rights can act as a best practice guide and positively contribute to global efforts to achieve gender equality.
Asking questions on monitoring opens the Pandora's box of measuring compliance with socio-economic rights. Audrey Chapman warns that ''monitoring state compliance is a complex and exacting process with numerous political and methodological prerequisites. '' 7 The CESCR has pioneered the concept of the minimum core, and with the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (OP-ICESCR), it is now poised to contribute to the development of the reasonableness standard. 8 These monitoring tools have been praised and criticized. But none of these evaluative tools have been designed to capture gender inequalities, and the relationship between monitoring the ICESCR and equality has largely been unexplored. Can gender equality be integrated into established monitoring standards, or is it more conceptually sound to establish a new and separate monitoring standard? This article argues that both approaches should be simultaneously pursued. Enriching the current monitoring approaches with equality is essential to uphold women's socio-economic rights. For both principled and pragmatic reasons, it is also necessary to develop a separate equality-monitoring tool so as to be able to identify all of the ways women experience violations of their socio-economic rights. While there have been prior proposals for monitoring gender equality under the ICESCR, this article proposes that Sandra Fredman's four-dimensional model of substantive equality offers the ideal framework for the CESCR to employ. 9 The article begins by providing context on the role of the CESCR in ensuring compliance with the ICESCR. The second part maps the CESCR's current approach to monitoring to understand how equality can fit into this process. The third part explains that even though the CESCR has made reference to certain aspects of gender equality, there is still a need for gender-sensitive monitoring standards. The fourth part analyzes how the various monitoring standards are able to grapple with gender inequality in the implementation of socio-economic rights. It argues that incorporating gender equality into the current evaluative tools and developing an independent equality monitoring framework are necessary to detect the complex ways in which women experience violations of their socio-economic rights. Using Fredman's four-dimensional model of substantive equality, the fourth part sketches the contours of an equality-based standard and concludes by demonstrating how this can enrich the monitoring of the ICESCR.
The Role of the CESCR
The CESCR is not a judicial body. 10 This formal position belies the important authoritative role that the CESCR can play in developing socio-economic rights. The guarantees in the ICESCR are open-textured, and the CESCR provides guidance so that states know the scope of their obligations. 11 Through a multi-faceted accountability structure, the CESCR shines an analytical spotlight on places where the state has not fully implemented the ICESCR. By engaging in constructive dialogue with the state, civil society organizations (CSOs), and, now under the OP-ICESCR, the individual, the CESCR proposes recommendations on how to best implement the ICESCR.
General Comments
Although the General Comments are the pre-eminent method for the CESCR to elucidate the ICESCR, there is no reference to the General Comments in the treaty. Upon a standing request from the UN Economic and Social Council, the CESCR has drafted numerous General Comments on the obligations in the ICESCR. The General Comments develop the legal obligations in the treaty, identify barriers to socio-economic rights, and share information on best practices. 12 The CESCR explains that the goal is to provide a detailed analysis of specific rights in the ICESCR and assist states in fulfilling their obligations. 13 The General Comments do not merely provide a conceptual analysis of the ICESCR. They direct states on the information the CESCR wants the state to include in the periodic reporting process. 14 The accountability mechanisms are meant to form a coherent and harmonious structure. Thus, the standards and monitoring approaches articulated in the General Comments should filter into the remaining accountability mechanisms.
Periodic Reporting Process
Under Article 16 and 17 of the ICESCR, states must submit a report to the CESCR ''outlining the factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment'' of socio-economic rights. State reports are notorious for being incomplete and self-congratulatory. 15 To supplement these shortcomings, the CESCR encourages CSOs to submit shadow reports, and it conducts a written and oral dialogue session with the state. The Concluding Observations highlight the positive areas of development, express areas of concern, and provide recommendations. This process is designed to be self-reflective, to facilitate meaningful dialogue between the CESCR, the state, and CSOs, and encourage good practices. 16 
Optional Protocol
Under the Optional Protocol, the CESCR examines complaints that the state has violated the ICESCR. 17 Unlike the General Comments and the Concluding Observations, the OP-ICESCR mandates that the CESCR assess these complaints on the basis of reasonableness. The CESCR does not release legally binding judgments but communicates its views and provides recommendations. There is a process for inter-state communications and an inquiry procedure into grave and systemic violations of the ICESCR, but this has not yet been utilized. 18
A Multi-faceted Approach to Monitoring
With this contextual backdrop in place, the first step in assessing the best practices for the CESCR to monitor women's socio-economic rights is to analyze the CESCR's approach to monitoring the ICESCR. The CESCR employs a multi-faceted strategy as it uses several different standards. Arguably, it is also incoherent and conceptually confusing as the CESCR has not provided any theoretical explanations for how these standards operate together. In part, this is because each of the evaluative tools used by the CESCR is in response to different critiques of socio-economic rights. There was never any over-arching design or plan on how to best monitor the implementation of the ICESCR, and the result is an often perplexing array of monitoring standards. Equally challenging, there is a disconnect between the standards set in the text of the treaty, those advocated for in the General Comments, and those used in monitoring the Concluding Observations and individual communications. This section briefly sketches the various standards drawn upon by the CESCR, the critiques of each, and the relationship between these different monitoring tools. It can be difficult to even determine what qualifies as a standard or tool for monitoring the ICESCR. Are the typology of duties, the minimum core, and reasonableness all monitoring tools or different facets of the states' obligations? The aim of this article 16 is not to answer this question or resolve the debate on the monitoring techniques but, rather, to map out the different approaches so as to have the necessary base to understand the role equality plays in monitoring the ICESCR. Thus, it looks at the prominent tools that the CESCR employs to flesh out and monitor the state's obligations. It uses the two latest General Comments from 2016 on the right to just and fair working conditions and on the right to sexual and reproductive health, the Concluding Observations from the March 2016 reporting round (Canada, Kenya, and Namibia), and the two decisions decided on their merits under the OP-ICESCR.
Seemingly, the starting place to understand how the CESCR monitors women's socio-economic rights would be General Comment no. 16 on the Equal Rights of Men and Women to the Equal Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (General Comment on Equality) 19 and General Comment no. 20 on NonDiscrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (General Comment on Non-Discrimination). 20 In these two General Comments, the CESCR reflects on equality, non-discrimination, and socio-economic rights. Surprisingly, neither of these General Comments engages with the monitoring of women's socio-economic rights. In fact, the CESCR appears to leave it to the state to develop monitoring tools. 21 Thus, examining these sources does not assist in this analysis. Only the latest General Comments are analyzed in this article since it is here that the CESCR continues to refine and apply the monitoring tools it has developed. Using the CESCR's outputs from 2016 does limit the extent of the conclusions and forecloses an evolutionary assessment. However, it provides a detailed snapshot of the CESCR's current approach, and, arguably, the latest outputs impliedly synthesize and improve on previous monitoring techniques and, therefore, embody the organization's general approach to monitoring. assess how much of these resources should be devoted to the realization of socioeconomic rights. 23 Second, under the progressive realization element, the CESCR needs to develop benchmarks and indicators to assess if the state has moved sufficiently quickly to fully realize socio-economic rights. Progressive realization recognizes that it may take time to fully realize socio-economic rights. 24 While it is a necessary ''flexibility device,'' 25 it still imposes an obligation to immediately, or within a reasonably short time, take concrete ''steps towards'' realizing socioeconomic rights. 26 In the General Observations, the CESCR only makes passing reference to this standard. Under the heading of ''maximum available resources,'' the CESCR expresses concern about Canada's stagnating levels of social spending and low corporate tax rates 27 and about Kenya's levels of corruption in the public sector, illicit financial flows, and tax avoidance. 28 There is no reference to the maximum available resources in the Concluding Observations for Namibia. A fully developed maximum available resources test would involve a detailed analysis of the resources and budget of the state to determine if a sufficient portion of its resources were directed towards socio-economic rights, not merely flagging areas of under-spending or corruption. With respect to progressive realization, the CESCR only recommends that Canada, Kenya, and Namibia ''take steps to progressively develop and apply appropriate indicators on the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. '' 29 This falls far short of the robust analysis required under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. As has been noted before, this is because these are highly contextualized standards. The time and energy needed to assess both the maximum available resources and the progressive realization for each of the 164 states parties to the ICESCR is beyond the capacity of the CESCR. 30 In partial response to concerns that socio-economic rights are imprecise and only programmatic, the CESCR has pioneered the concept of the minimum core. 31 The CESCR holds that there is a ''minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights.'' 32 It illustrates the concept by holding that when a significant number of individuals are deprived of food, primary health care, housing, and basic education then the state is in violation of the minimum core obligation under the ICESCR. 33 The concept of the minimum core has been contentious in theory and practice. Proponents argue that it gives a determinacy to socio-economic rights. 34 It provides a litmus test. 35 To achieve this aim, it is necessary to articulate what is meant by ''minimum.'' There have been various proposals, the most prominent being survival, dignity, and consensus. In her seminal critique of the minimum core, Katharine Young argues that these definitions are insufficient. Focusing on the minimum socio-economic rights necessary for survival conceptualizes a very narrow understanding of life and ''misses the important connections between dignity and human flourishing.'' 36 However, equating the minimum core to dignity is equally problematic as dignity is an elusive concept that cannot be easily defined, making it difficult to determine what minimum level of socio-economic rights are necessary for a dignified life. 37 In respect to consensus-based definitions, aside from the methodological concerns on determining consensus, it connects the minimum core to the lowest common denominator. 38 Attempts to concretize the minimum core rather than providing guidance have only led to further problems.
Maximum Available Resources and Progressive Realization
Although the CESCR has historically been at the vanguard of the minimum core, in practice, the CESCR has not truly applied this doctrine. There is no reference to the minimum core in the Concluding Observations. In General Comment no. 23 40 The core obligations approach has been criticized as being ad hoc and following ''a meandering course of logic.'' 41 The core obligations for the right to just and fair working conditions include: combating gender discrimination and harassment at work; establishing minimum wages; developing a health and safety policy; and enforcing minimum working standards. 42 With respect to sexual and reproductive health, the CESCR holds that the core obligations include: repealing laws that criminalize access to sexual and reproductive health services; universal and equitable access to sexual and reproductive health service; legal prohibitions on gender-based violence; preventing unsafe abortions; access to comprehensive sex education; provision of medicine, equipment, and technology for sexual and reproductive health; and access to remedies for violations. 43 It is difficult to discern a coherent explanation that unites the different facets of the core obligation, especially when comparing the core obligations between the right to just and fair working conditions and the right to sexual and reproductive health.
In the Concluding Observations, the CESCR does not explicitly use the term, but it does express concern that states are not fulfilling various core obligations identified in the General Comments. However, it does not consistently evaluate states' compliance with the core obligation. While for Canada, Kenya, and Namibia, the CESCR expressed concerns about the minimum wage, there is no reference to harassment at work. 44 In regard to sexual and reproductive health, it raised the issue of access to abortion in Canada and Kenya but not in Namibia. 45 In Kenya, the CESCR discussed sex education and the cost of giving birth; it held Canada to task for the cost of contraception; and, in Namibia, it focused on HIV/AIDS and sterilization. 46 There has recently been tension in Canada between religious groups and the state on the delivery of sex education, 47 and there is limited access to abortion in Namibia, 48 so it is disappointing that these issues, identified as core obligations in the General Comments, were not discussed by the CESCR in the Concluding Observations. It also points to the need to have a comprehensive monitoring tool that can guide the CESCR so that crucial issues of gender equality and socio-economic rights are not overlooked.
Respect, Protect, and Fulfil
Traditionally, civil and political rights were conceptualized as exclusively creating negative duties of restraint, while socio-economic rights imposed positive duties. A significant amount of scholarship and case law has debunked the distinction between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights and has shown that both types of rights give rise to negative and positive duties. 49 The CESCR, adopting Henry Shue's typology, holds that each right gives rise to duties to respect, protect, and fulfil. 50 This was first used by the CESCR in 1999 in General Comment no. 12 on the Right to Adequate Food. 51 Using sexual and reproductive health as an example, the duty to respect ''requires States to refrain from directly or indirectly interfering with the enjoyment of the right to sexual and reproductive health.'' 52 For instance, states need to decriminalize same-sex sexual activity. The duty to protect ''requires States to take measures to prevent third parties from directly or indirectly interfering with the enjoyment of right [s] . '' 53 This includes regulating the conduct of private health care facilities, insurance, and pharmaceutical companies. And, finally, the duty to fulfil ''requires 46. Concluding Observations: Canada, supra note 27 at para 51; Concluding Observations: Kenya, supra note 28 at para 53; Concluding Observations: Namibia, supra note 29 at para 67. States to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures to ensure the full realization of the right.'' 54 This requires, inter alia, the state to eradicate barriers such as the cost to sexual and reproductive health care and to address prejudices on menstruation, pregnancy, masturbation, sexuality, and fertility.
In the General Comment on Sexual Health, the CESCR links this typology to violations under the ICESCR. Under the heading ''Violations,'' the CESCR uses the respect, protect, and fulfil model to illustrate how the state is in contravention of the treaty. Audrey Chapman has argued for a separate violations approach to the ICESCR that looks at: (1) the actions of the state; (2) the patterns of discrimination; and (3) the failure to fulfil the minimum core, but the CESCR has not adopted this model. 55 Going a step further, the CESCR connects the obligation to fulfil to the progressive realization standard: ''[V]iolations of the obligation to fulfil also occur where States fail to progressively ensure that sexual and reproductive health facilities, goods and services are available. '' 56 The link between obligations to fulfil and progressive realization are not explored in detail. Connecting these two standards can be deeply problematic as many of the obligations to fulfil are closely related to gender equality, such as maternal health care, which are an immediate obligation. 57 This tension is explored further in the fourth part of this article. Confusingly, in the General Comment on Working Conditions, the CESCR does not use the typology of duties but, rather, identifies ''Violations'' as acts of commission and omission. 58 In the Concluding Observations, similar to the core obligations, there is no direct reference to the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil. However, the CESCR does appear to draw on this typology. The General Comment on Working Conditions, as part of the obligation to protect, requires the state to pass laws on the minimum wage 59 and in the Concluding Observations for Canada, Kenya and Namibia, the CESCR makes a similar recommendation. 60 It echoes the obligation to fulfil as explained in the General Comment on Sexual Health when it recommends that Kenya provide sex education and that Namibia focus on delivering HIV services. 61 54. However, like the core obligations, the CESCR does not consistently hold states accountable to the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil. There is no reference to the state regulating health care and pharmaceutical companies in the Concluding Observations, which the CESCR identifies as an obligation to protect.
Reasonableness
The OP-ICESCR empowers the individual to hold the state accountable for failing to uphold the rights in the ICESCR. Under Article 8(4), when deciding the individual claim, the CESCR ''shall consider the reasonableness'' of the state's actions in implementing the ICESCR and ''shall bear in mind that the [state] may adopt a range of policy measures. '' 62 This introduces an additional monitoring standardreasonableness-and raises challenging questions on the meaning of reasonableness.
It was adopted to ensure that the CESCR did not unduly interfere with the state's economic, social, and cultural laws, budgets, and policies. 63 Reasonableness in the context of socio-economic rights has been primarily developed by the South African Constitutional Court. In a series of cases, the court has fleshed out the reasonableness standard to include ''the levels of rights provisions, speed of progressive realisation and budget appropriations . . . planning, monitoring, meaningful engagement and prioritisation of vulnerable [groups] . '' 64 Critics argue that this standard is too deferential to the state and does not adequately define the content of socio-economic rights. 65 There have been concerns that reasonableness has resulted in the proceduralization of socio-economic rights. 66 Proponents argue that it is sufficiently robust. Bruce Porter notes that ''the reasonableness standard imposes obligations on all actors to make decisions that are consistent with a firm commitment to the progressive realization of [socio-economic] while Sandra Liebenberg and Geo Quinot hold that the state needs to adopt ''a rightsconscious policy, planning and budgeting process.'' 68 The CESCR has not had much opportunity yet to apply this new standard. It has only decided two individual communications and in neither case did the CESCR articulate a fully fleshed out conception of reasonableness. In IDG v Spain, it determined that there were other possible measures the state could have taken to provide notice regarding the enforcement of a mortgage. 69 In Rodriguez v Spain, the CESCR held that reducing a prisoner's non-contributory disability benefit by an amount equivalent to the cost of his upkeep in prison was not a violation of the ICESCR. 70 It noted that the reduction was a reasonable means of allocating state resources. 71 Prior to the OP-ICESCR coming into force, the CESCR held that in reviewing the state's measures on the grounds of reasonableness, it will assess whether: the measures are targeted towards the fulfilment of the ICESCR; the measures are non-discriminatory; the allocation of resources are in accordance with international human rights standards; the measures are the least restrictive; the measures are taken in a reasonable time frame; the measures take account of disadvantaged and marginalized groups; the state prioritized grave situations; and the measures are transparent and participatory. 72 
The Relationship between Monitoring Standards
The relationship between these different standards is far from clear, and there appears to be significant overlap. Turning to the most prominent standards in the General Comments-the core obligations and respect, protect, and fulfil-the CESCR uses identical examples to illustrate these two standards. As seen above, laws on minimum wage are classified as both core obligations and obligations to protect. But there is not a perfect overlap between these two standards. Under the obligation to fulfil, states are encouraged to establish non-contributory social security programs for informal workers, but this is not identified as a core obligation. Thus, there is some substantive difference between these standards, but precisely how they differ is not readily apparent. The time element may be a possible difference; core obligations are immediately enforceable, whereas the typology of duties, particularly the obligation to fulfil, has been linked to a progressive realization. However, the CESCR has not explored this in any detail. In the Concluding Observations, when the standards overlap, the CESCR does not articulate the type of violation. On what basis does the CESCR conclude that social assistance rates are inadequate in Canada: core obligation or obligation to fulfil? 73 Or does this suggest that the typology of duties can be applied to the minimum core? Furthermore, despite the multiple standards developed in the General Comments, it is often unclear in the Concluding Observations what, if any, standard the CESCR is using to identify areas of concern. This contradicts the CESCR's own advice to take account of the General Comments in the periodic reporting process. As another layer of confusion, when discussing ''Violations,'' the CESCR draws on the typology of duties, acts of commission/omission, and progressive realization, but it makes no reference to the core obligations.
Prior to the OP-ICESCR, there was no prominent role for the maximum available resources/progressive realization standard. Reasonableness under the OP-ICESCR may have reactivated these standards since resource allocation and the time frame for achieving socio-economic rights are facets of reasonableness. There are glimmers of this in Rodriguez where the CESCR accepted the state's allocation of resources as a reasonable use of public funds. But how does reasonableness fit with core obligations and respect, protect, and fulfil? The individual decisions make no mention of these other standards. Brian Griffey optimistically observes ''that [reasonableness] has not changed the obligations imposed by the [ICESCR] . '' 74 Similarly the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) holds that reasonableness was always a part of the maximum available resources/ progressive realization standard. 75 But the CESCR does not meaningfully employ these standards in the General Comments or the Concluding Observations, so there is still uncertainty on how reasonableness functions with the evaluative tools it actually uses. If the state has failed to achieve a core obligation or violated the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil, could this amount to unreasonableness under the ICESCR?
Searching for a unifying conception to monitoring the ICESCR is arguably futile as the different standards it uses are in response to different, albeit interlocking, problems that are related to, inter alia, the justiciability of socio-economic rights. Although David Bilchitz has observed that it is difficult to uncover the CESCR's precise reasoning, it is possible to identify general motivations. 76 Maximum available resources/progressive realization acknowledges the role of budgets and time in the implementation of the ICESCR. The minimum core/core obligations aim to give a determinacy so as to be easily able to identify breaches of the ICESCR. The typology of obligations demonstrates that, similar to civil and political rights, there are elements of socio-economic rights that are immediately enforceable. And, lastly, the reasonableness standard recognizes that the state has the discretion to employ a range of measures. In sum, the CESCR uses all of these methods concurrently to enhance socioeconomic rights. Monitoring the ICESCR is multi-faceted and equal parts robust, confusing, and pragmatic. In practice, the CESCR ignores the monitoring standards established in the text of the treaty and has developed its own approach. It primarily relies on the core obligations and the typology of duties, but it is not consistent in applying these standards when reviewing the state's implementation of the ICESCR. There are many potential explanations for these inconsistencies: information provided by the state or CSOs in the periodic reporting process; the interests of individual members of the committee; and even the politics of the international human rights system. The goal here is not to understand the root causes of the committee's inconsistent use of these standards but, simply, to grasp the committee's different approach to monitoring. With this map in place, this article now turns to whether the CESCR is able to use this multi-faceted approach to comprehensively hold states accountable for women's socio-economic rights.
The Need for Gender-Sensitive Monitoring Standards
A cursory glance at the General Comments and Concluding Observations suggests that even in this multi-faceted monitoring framework, the CESCR is able to monitor women's socio-economic rights. Many times, it expresses concerns on women's rights. A careful analysis, however, reveals that without a gender equality framework, either integrated into the current standards or as a stand-alone framework, the CESCR is not fully approaching the monitoring of the ICESCR from a gender perspective. Although the observation that the CESCR has not fully engendered the ICESCR has been made before, this has largely been made in relation to the normative content of the rights in the treaty. 77 This section briefly analyzes the Concluding Observations from Canada, Kenya, and Namibia and the latest two General Comments to make the case that part of the problem is that the CESCR has 76. Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, supra note 23 at 185. 77. Fredman, ''Engendering'', supra note 4. not adopted a gender-sensitive approach to monitoring women's socio-economic rights.
On the positive side, the latest General Comment makes numerous references to how women experience violations of the right to fair and just working conditions and the right to sexual and reproductive health. The CESCR identifies key ways that women's rights are undermined-maternal mortality, lack of access to abortion, forced marriage, and marital rape-and provides recommendations on how these issues can best be addressed-repealing laws, ensuring access to information, goods and services, and addressing stereotypes. 78 Similarly in the General Comment on Working Conditions, the CESCR calls on states to address the gender wage gap, sexual harassment, maternal and parental leave, the working conditions of domestic workers, and unpaid work. 79 The problem is that the CESCR has never articulated or explicitly used any tools to explain why these are violations of Article 2(2) (non-discrimination), Article 3 (equality), Article 7 (right to work), and Article 12 (right to health) of the ICESCR. The areas of concern that the CESCR emphasizes, and its recommendations of best practice, highlight crucial areas of gender inequalities, but the CESCR fails to articulate with any degree of precision a background theory explaining why the examples provided undermine the ICESCR. The General Comments are essentially just examples of gender inequalities. An example helps illustrate this problem. In the General Comment on Sexual Health, the CESCR notes that substantive equality requires that the ''barriers that particular groups may face [need to be] addressed. '' 80 Gender stereotypes on caregiving roles are identified by the CESCR as obstacles to women's equal right to sexual and reproductive health. 81 It is correct to note that cultural attitudes are a prominent barrier, but the CESCR does not give any framework or tools for identifying other barriers or emerging obstacles to women's socio-economic rights. Without any framework, states do not have the necessary guidance to be able to identify the specific and unique obstacles that exist within their domestic context, and the CESCR is not able to comprehensively monitor the implementation of the ICESCR. The CESCR's prior General Comments that specifically examine gender equality and non-discrimination similarly focus on providing examples of best practices that states should pursue and do not develop any analytical tools for evaluating state compliance with Article 2(2) and Article 3. 82 The General Comments on equality and non-discrimination are analyzed in greater detail in the fifth part of this article. The Concluding Observations repeat the problems found in the General Comments. The CESCR does address both entrenched problems and even some newer obstacles to gender equality, such as gender-based violence, discrimination in customary laws, and the plight of migrant domestic workers. 83 It also specifically highlights that steps to realize socio-economic rights such as anti-poverty measures, legal aid, and water programs need to be targeted towards women. 84 However, there is still significant room for improvement. There is no reference to the gender dimensions in relation to social security, food, housing, or land. References to gender inequalities still tend to centre on the most obvious examples such as gender-based violence and gender pay gaps. In Kenya, the CESCR only mentions in passing that pregnant learners are more likely to drop out of school, without identifying the specific barriers that are obstructing equality in the right to education. For instance, it does not assess if student drop-out rates are the result of inadequate daycare or breast-feeding facilities at school or if negative stereotypes from students and teachers pressure pregnant girls and new mothers into leaving school. Similarly, in relation to Namibia and Canada, as mentioned in the first part of this article, the CESCR overlooks discussing de facto pressing obstacles to women's sexual and reproductive health. There may be many reasons that explain these oversights, such as CSOs not bringing these issues to the attention of the CESCR. 85 However, the ability of the committee to comprehensively monitor women's socio-economic rights would be improved with monitoring tools that are gender sensitive. 86 
A Dual Approach to Monitoring Women's Socio-Economic Rights
Having mapped out the CESCR's current approach and sifted rhetoric from reality on the monitoring of socio-economic rights and demonstrated the need for a gendersensitive approach, it is now possible to return to the central question and assess how gender equality fits into the monitoring of the ICESCR. There are two potential approaches: (1) incorporating equality into the maximum available resources/ progressive realization standard, the core obligations, the typology of duties, and reasonableness or (2) establishing gender equality as a separate standard of review. There are pros and cons to each position. Practically, incorporating gender equality into the already established standards avoids creating a further standard in what is already a crowded monitoring field. A plethora of monitoring standards to be simultaneously applied creates a risk of complicating the monitoring of the ICESCR. It also avoids the complications of figuring out how gender equality functions with other standards. However, streamlining equality into the other standards runs a significant risk that gender equality in the implementation of socio-economic rights will continue to be overlooked. On a more principled basis, it may be conceptually illogical to integrate equality into other monitoring mechanisms, and there may still be gaps in identifying breaches of Articles 2(2) and 3. Establishing gender equality as a separate accountability tool could offer a more focused approach to women's socio-economic rights. On the downside, this could add to the workload of the already under-funded and over-worked CESCR.
To determine which option offers the best approach, this part begins by considering how to incorporate gender equality into the current monitoring standards. At the outset, it is also helpful to remember the purpose of monitoring standards: it is a tool that identifies when a state has failed to uphold its ICESCR commitments. The purpose of the analysis here is to examine if gender equality, either as a stand-alone standard of review or united with the other monitoring standards, is able to comprehensively and with a high degree of precision identify when the state has not fulfilled its obligation under Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR. To answer this question, this part examines the relationship between gender equality and all of the standards the CESCR discusses and actually uses.
This part concludes that a gender equality framework enhances the monitoring of the ICESCR process in multiple and complementary ways. Gender equality can and should be incorporated into the existing monitoring standards. Paying attention to how current monitoring approaches can shine a spotlight on gender inequalities will immensely enrich women's socio-economic rights. However, as demonstrated in the second part of this article, each standard is targeted towards measuring different aspects of the realization of socio-economic rights. This means that none of the monitoring standards are able to capture all of the ways women experience violations of their socio-economic rights, even when enriched with gender equality. Under the current approach, crucial aspects of gender inequality will remain in the shadows. Thus, there also needs to be an independent standard of review that can detect the various and nuanced ways in which women's socio-economic rights are undermined. Although this may add to the work of the committee, the alternative that the violations of women's socio-economic rights remain invisible is unacceptable. The most comprehensive and coherent approach is to pursue both of the options identified above: to incorporate gender equality as far as possible into the current monitoring standards and to establish a separate gender equality framework.
Maximum Available Resources/Progressive Realization
As more resources become available, the obligation on the state to progressively realize socio-economic rights increases. Maximum available resources/progressive realization is potentially a robust analysis that examines the development and allocation of resources and measures the state's efforts over a period of time. Although this standard has in practice been ignored by the CESCR, scholarship has focused on three specific areas: (1) assessing the state's available revenue and resourcesfor example, by looking at the state's tax structures 87 -the availability of resources through international cooperation, 88 and even non-financial resources; 89 (2) examining the allocation of resources, particularly by analyzing if the state's budget has provided sufficient funds to operationalize socio-economic rights; 90 and (3) developing benchmarks to measure the state's progress. 91 There are potential benefits to integrating maximum available resources/ progressive realization and gender equality. The development and allocation of resources can significantly re-entrench women's disadvantage. International cooperation and assistance can come with criteria that limit gender equality such as by refusing to fund sexual and reproductive health services 92 or requiring the government to cut fundamental public services on which women disproportionately rely. 93 Tax structures can incentivize women not to work in the labour market. 94 Similarly, the process taken to progressively realize rights can discriminate against women. 95 Adding a gender equality lens to the maximum available resources/ progressive realization standard will ensure that the state takes account of gender inequalities when developing and budgeting the state's resources and that benchmarks used to monitor the progressive realization take full account of women's disadvantage. Integrating these two standards has already begun, with significant work being done to ensure budgets are gender and human rights compatible. 96 While gender equality can enhance the assessment of the state's maximum available resources/progressive realization, there are limitations to using this enriched standard to detect breaches of women's socio-economic rights. A maximum available resources/progressive realization/gender equality analytical lens will not capture crucial aspects of gender inequality, such as how legislation strips women of their legal status and benefits when they marry a non-national; 97 the noncriminalization of marital rape; 98 the non-recognition of unpaid work in divorce proceedings; 99 the lack of legal protection for de facto unions; 100 criminalizing health services that only women require; 101 or different ages of marriage for men and women. 102 Although these examples are seemingly violations of civil and political rights, they are also violations of the ICESCR and undermine women's equality under Article 6 (the right to work), Article 10 (protection of the family), Article 11 (adequate standard of living), and Article 12 (health). An independent gender equality analysis would easily be able to capture these problems. When equality is tied to maximum available resources/progressive realization standard, this narrows the scope of the analysis. The two standards in tandem can only examine gender equality in connection with resources. It is unable to see gender inequalities that impact on socio-economic rights that are outside of that remit-for example, inequalities that are based in law or socio-cultural misrecognition.
There are also conceptual difficulties in using gender equality and maximum available resources/progressive realization to identify breaches of Article 2(2) and 3 due to their fundamentally different approaches to the timing of the obligation. Maximum available resources/progressive realization is measuring the implementation of socio-economic rights over a period of time. Equality is an immediate obligation. 103 The UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women in Law and Practice forcefully holds: ''Women's right to equality in economic and social rights is substantive, immediate and enforceable. It concerns the division of existing resources, not the development of resources, and therefore the principle of progressive realization does not apply. '' 104 Progressive realization is essentially a forward-looking standard and is not able to diagnose fundamental gender equality harms because equality is an immediate obligation. This is a significant obstacle to integrating these two standards. Some commentators have tried to find a way through this impasse and have argued that only certain aspects of equality are immediately enforceable. Porter draws on the typology of duties and argues that states have an obligation to immediately respect and protect the right of non-discrimination. The obligation to fulfil equality through positive action is ''subject to available resources and . . . progressive realization. '' 105 Similarly, Ben Saul and colleagues, in their commentary on the ICESCR, explain that the CESCR holds that de jure discrimination must be removed immediately, while ''failure to achieve de facto equality immediately may, in exceptional cases, be justified on the basis of a lack of available resources.'' 106 On this understanding, there is potential to further connect progressive realization and gender equality.
The latter approach, while offering a route to full integration, is problematic because it risks undermining important gains in the evolution of equality. First, as Dianne Otto observes, connecting obligations to fulfil women's equality under Article 3 implies that the other disadvantaged groups referred to in Article 2(2), such as religious and ethnic minorities, only enjoy ''the limited negative protection of non-discrimination.'' 107 Due to the structure of the ICESCR, fracturing equality and non-discrimination means that the state only has a positive obligation to achieve gender equality but no similar obligation to other disadvantaged identity groups. This interpretation runs contrary to the intentions of the drafters, who specifically rejected subjecting non-discrimination to progressive realization. 108 Second, this approach seemingly splits non-discrimination and equality into two separate concepts, which is not consistent with international human rights law. The CESCR observes that non-discrimination and equality are ''integrally related and mutually reinforcing.'' 109 The definition of discrimination adopted by the CESCR, which draws on the definition of discrimination in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW ), holds that discrimination against women is any distinction made on the basis of sex that impairs the enjoyment ''on the basis of equality of men and women, of human rights.'' 110 The state is obligated to ensure that rights are enjoyed without discrimination, and this means that, through the interpretative work of the CESCR, the state is required to ensure that any distinctions do not impede equality in socio-economic rights. 111 If a distinction does not uphold or further women's equality, then there has been discrimination. In international human rights law, equality is at the heart of discrimination. These two concepts are intimately connected. Thus, attempts to divide non-discrimination and equality between immediate and progressive realization are conceptually impossible. 112 Third, another potential unintended consequence is that fracturing equality between immediate and progressive components potentially unravels the rich concept of equality that has been developed by, inter alia, the treaty bodies. The CESCR observes that ''[g]uarantees of non-discrimination and equality in international human rights treaties mandate both de facto and de jure equality. De jure (or formal) equality and de facto (or substantive) equality are different but interconnected concepts.'' 113 Formal equality is closely tied, but not equated, to obligations of respect. Connecting immediacy/obligations of respect/non-discrimination strongly implies that the state only has an immediate obligation to achieve formal equality. Substantive equality, which is closely associated with the obligation to fulfil, only has to be progressively realized. It implies that states are only under an immediate obligation to remove de jure barriers. There is no requirement on the state to immediately interrogate the current allocation of resources and the structure of laws, policies, and programs that entrench women's disadvantage. While the CESCR does allow for states to justify the failure to eliminate substantive inequality in extremely exceptional circumstances of resource constraint, it does not permit the state to refrain from taking immediate steps to redress substantive equality. 114 Linking equality/obligation to fulfil/progressive realization characterizes substantive 109. CESCR, General Comment no 16, supra note 3 at para 3. 110. Ibid at para 11; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW ), 17 July 1980, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981), art 1. 111. Campbell, supra note 85, ch 4. 112. Otto, supra note 6 at 36. 113. CESCR, General Comment no 16, supra note 3 at para 7 [emphasis added]. 114. CESCR, General Comment no 20, supra note 22 at para 13. gender equality as some distant, quasi-unattainable goal that women must wait to enjoy. This potentially ignores the many aspects of substantive gender equality that can be easily achieved with a reconfiguration of the state's priorities and resources. An example helps explain the possible danger of dividing equality among immediate and progressive lines. Maternal mortality is still shockingly high in many countries around the world, 115 and these deaths are easily preventable. 116 Maternal mortality is often not due to de jure or formal inequalities but, rather, the result of entrenched and systemic inequalities. 117 Addressing maternal mortality does not involve developing resources. To reduce maternal mortality rates, it is imperative that the state take seriously their commitment to gender equality and properly fund maternal health programs. 118 However, characterizing the obligation to fulfil equality as a progressive obligation means the state has space to continue to justify high rates of maternal mortality. This is a tragic and pressing issue of substantive gender equality that can and should be immediately addressed. The potential for maternal mortality and other similar under-prioritized aspects of substantive gender equality to be postponed through dividing the timing of equality obligations should give serious pause to adopting this approach. Equality can and should enhance the calculation of the state's resources and the steps taken to fully realize socioeconomic rights, but gender equality cannot be subject to progressive realization.
CESCR,
Rejecting obligations to fulfil equality as a progressive obligation does raise questions on the proper relationship between equality and time in the ICESCR. It is principally, strategically, and pragmatically important to stress that gender equality is an immediate obligation. However, women's disadvantage in socio-economic rights is often due to deeply embedded patriarchal and oppressive norms and structures. Modifying these norms and structures is a process that can require time. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women's (CEDAW Committee) approach to monitoring gender equality is illuminating here. It requires that the state: (1) immediately assess the de jure and de facto situation of women and (2) immediately take concrete steps to formulate and implement a policy that ''is targeted as clearly as possible towards'' achieving substantive equality. 119 Andrew Byrnes explains ''the obligation to adopt a policy is an immediate one . . .
[but] the obligation . . . also is continuing and includes the responsibility to monitor progress and adjust the policy as time passes.'' 120 The state is not setting a timetable for when to progressively realize gender equality, but, instead, ''the emphasis is on movement forward . . . to build on [appropriate] measures continuously in the light of their effectiveness and new or emerging issues, in order to achieve the Convention's goals.'' 121 Given the importance of harmonization within the UN system, 122 and the CESCR's fruitful history of drawing on the work of the CEDAW Committee, the CESCR can adopt a similar approach and can immediately evaluate the state's policy to achieve gender equality. 123 This is a more coherent approach to monitoring Article 2(2) and Article 3 of the ICESCR than fracturing equality into immediate and progressive components.
Minimum Core and Core Obligations
There is no accepted definition of the minimum core; as such, there is potential to make a case that the minimum core should be defined as gender equality. Young's critique of equating the minimum core with normative concepts focused mostly on dignity, although it also referred to equality. By equating the minimum core with gender equality, the state has not fulfilled the ICESCR if it has not immediately guaranteed gender equality in socio-economic rights. Both gender equality and minimum core are immediate obligations, so unlike maximum available resources/ progressive realization, there is logic in tying these two standards together. Moreover, integrating these tools emphasizes the immediacy of gender equality. In theory, a minimum core/gender equality standard would be able to detect the numerous ways that women's socio-economic rights are violated since an equality framework is doing the analytical ''heavy-lifting.'' Prima facie, the CESCR appears to be embracing this approach as it routinely holds that non-discrimination and gender equality are core obligations. 124 Similar to maximum available resources/progressive realization, there are practical risks to collapsing minimum core and gender equality. Sandra Liebenberg notes that the minimum core/core obligation implies that there are non-core obligations that are subject to progressive realization. 125 This again raises the risk that equality will become fractured between core and non-core components. The temptation will be to see formal equality as a core obligation and substantive equality as non-core. This raises similar issues discussed above in relation to dividing equality between immediate and progressive elements-namely, that substantive equality will continue to be postponed and not treated as an immediate obligation. Exclusively equating the minimum core with gender equality may also limit the scope of protection under the ICESCR. If gender equality is the minimum core the state has to achieve, this might exclude the socio-economic rights of other disadvantaged groups from immediate protection.
Typology of Duties
The typology of duties is a tool for categorizing and understanding the nature of the state's obligations. The CEDAW Committee regularly relies on this typology in its General Recommendations to explain why states have not upheld women's rights under the CEDAW. 126 This suggests that there is a close connection between monitoring gender equality and the typology of duties. As Shue has recognized, the typology of duties is not a complete solution. 127 It is an ''abstract tool for describing multi-layered duties that arise from rights.'' 128 While it helpfully classifies the decriminalizing of abortion as an obligation to respect and ensures the justice system is sensitive to gender-based violence as an obligation to protect, the typology is not able to identify why these undermine women's right to sexual and reproductive health. When reviewing a state's action and inactions in the broad areas of life protected under the ICESCR, the typology of duties functions to classify measures. The limits of the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil is apparent when facing emerging challenges to women's socio-economic rights. Does the banning of the niqab violate girls and women's right to education? 129 Does it undermine women's health to limit the prosecution of gender-based violence perpetuated by nationals 131 The typology of duties was not designed and is not able to answer these questions. It is necessary to have an equalitymonitoring standard that detects gender inequalities, and then the typology of duties can help to characterize the nature of the state's obligation to improve women's socio-economic rights. These two standards are complementary, but it is essential to have an equality framework to detect the underlying lack of implementation of women's socio-economic rights.
Reasonableness
Reasonableness is a ''flexible and context sensitive basis for evaluating socioeconomic rights claims,'' and there is space to integrate gender equality and reasonableness. 132 The CESCR has specifically stated that it will assess, under reasonableness, if the state's actions are non-discriminatory. In Rodriguez, it did briefly examine if the state had discriminated between prisoners and non-prisoners, but this was not a fully fleshed-out analysis. Porter notes the close practical connection between these two standards. He observes that it ''will be difficult to identify any claims from vulnerable groups suffering . . . that could not also be framed as non-discrimination.'' 133 In the South African context, the Constitutional Court affirmed the centrality of equality in the assessment of reasonableness. 134 There has been criticism that the court has not fully integrated equality into the reasonableness standard, but, for the purposes here, it is sufficient to note the drive towards conceptualizing inequalities in socio-economic rights as unreasonable. 135 Enriching reasonableness with gender equality raises a similar problem with the typology of duties. Reasonableness on its own does not detect violations of women's socio-economic rights. It is an elastic concept and not able to answer the questions posed above on the relationship between women's socio-economic rights and the niqab, extraterritorial jurisdiction, or foreign funding of CSOs. There needs to be a fully developed equality standard that can then be incorporated into the reasonableness approach if the OP-ICESCR is going to seriously assess women's claims to socio-economic rights.
Conclusions
Drawing the threads together, the best approach to the monitoring of women's socio-economic rights is to: (1) incorporate a gender equality framework into the current monitoring standards and (2) establish an independent monitoring tool designed specifically to capture gender inequalities. There are significant benefits to enriching the current monitoring tools with gender equality. Maximum available resources/progressive realization and core obligations are more effective standards when they pay attention to the gender dimensions of developing and allocating resources and ensuring minimum standards for socio-economic rights. However, this is not a complete approach to ensuring compliance with Article 2(2) and 3. Principally, the maximum available resources/progressive standard cannot detect all of the potential non-compliance of women's socio-economic rights, and there is an inconsistency in the timing of the obligations.
Pragmatically, linking gender equality to maximum available resources/progressive realization and core obligations runs the significant risks of minimizing the state's obligation to achieve substantive gender equality in women's socio-economic rights. While the typology of duties helpfully characterizes the nature of the state's obligations towards women, and the reasonableness standard is flexible enough to pay specific attention to gender inequalities, both depend on having a fully developed gender equality monitoring tool in order to be relevant to women's socio-economic rights. Thus, it is necessary to also develop a tool that is specifically designed to capture gender inequalities in socio-economic rights.
Arguing for a dual approach to monitoring women's socio-economic rights does add an additional standard and may impact the workload of the CESCR. In part, this is necessary because of the CESCR's complex and multi-faceted approach to monitoring. Even though this proposed approach may come with a slight drawback, ensuring that the gender dimensions of socio-economic rights are properly identified outweighs this. Moreover, it puts the CESCR in a strong position to constructively dialogue with the state and propose tailored and compelling recommendations.
A Gender Equality Monitoring Framework
The next task is to arrive at a gender equality monitoring standard. The starting place is to assess how the text, context, and object and purpose of the ICESCR shape the definition of gender equality. 136 This section examines the treaty, the travaux preparatories, the General Comments, the approach of the CEDAW Committee, and the academic proposals on how to monitor women's rights under the ICESCR. It argues that Fredman's four-dimensional model of equality offers an easy to use, but sophisticated, monitoring tool and demonstrates how this model can work in practice.
ICESCR and the CESCR
The starting place is the text of the treaty but, similar to other UN treaties, the ICESCR does not define equality. The travaux preparatories do not discuss monitoring Articles 2(2) and 3 and only shed minimal light on the meaning of equality in the ICESCR. The drafters focused on only a few select issues: would affirmative action measures be permitted under Article 2(2) of the ICESCR; is a provision on gender equality redundant given that the treaty prohibits gender discrimination; is non-discrimination subject to progressive realization; and is the state required to prohibit discrimination committed by a private individual? 137 It has been left to the CESCR to develop the meaning of equality. Although its interpretation is not binding, it does have significant authoritative weight. The CESCR firmly holds that the ICESCR includes both formal and substantive equality. Formal equality ''is achieved if a law or policy treats men and women in a neutral manner.'' 138 The CESCR briefly explains that substantive equality ''is concerned, in addition, with the effects of laws, policies and practices and with ensuring that they do not maintain, but rather alleviate, the inherent disadvantage that particular groups' experience.'' 139 Although this definition importantly focuses on pre-existing disadvantage, it is not a robust concept of substantive equality, particularly in comparison with the CEDAW Committee's definition, discussed below. 140 As demonstrated in the second part of this article, the CESCR has not yet translated these broad statements into a comprehensive evaluative tool. It is possible to glean from the General Comments several components that could form the basis of an evaluative tool. pay attention to existing gender inequalities; address gender stereotypes; eliminate systemic discrimination; identify appropriate indicators and benchmarks; develop a plan of action; and take temporary special measures. 141 
CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee
As the leading instrument on women's rights, it is helpful to also look at how the CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee define equality and monitor the implementation of women's rights. Again surprisingly, the CEDAW does not define equality, but similar to the CESCR, the CEDAW Committee holds that it includes formal and substantive equality. The CEDAW Committee takes a multi-faceted approach to substantive equality. It has defined it as requiring: differential treatment; an equal start; ''equality of results''; ''overcoming the underrepresentation of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men and women''; ''[to] make choices without the limitation set by stereotypes, rigid gender roles and prejudices''; and ''real transformation of opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded in historically determined male paradigms of power and life patterns.'' 142 While the CEDAW Committee is at the forefront in upholding women's rights, it has been criticized for not translating this rich concept of equality into a monitoring framework. 143 There have been proposals, drawing on Fredman's fourdimensional model of equality, on how best to convert the Committee's understanding of equality into an analytical tool. 144 
Other Proposals
There is a small body of academic commentary discussing the monitoring of Articles 2(2) and 3. Recently, Christine Chinkin has proposed criteria that a state would have to meet to uphold girls' equal right to education. 145 Her proposal is very specific to the education context and is not designed to evaluate states' compliance with gender equality and all of the socio-economic rights in the ICESCR.
Dianne Otto has also proposed a framework, but, in practice, her proposal is difficult to apply. It involves a series of classifications and questions: (1) Is the measure gender neutral or differentiated, and does it treat sub-groups of women differently; (2) is the measure aimed to achieve structural equality; (3) what is the qualitative outcome for women and for men; (4) what is the qualitative outcome for subgroups of women and subgroups of men; and (5) if substantive equality has not been achieved, does the law need to be redesigned? 146 She proposes a long list of factors to achieve substantive equality that in essence mirrors the CESCR and the CEDAW Committee's description of substantive equality. This list is long, slightly repetitive, and unyielding. Moreover, the list is not organized to mediate tensions in different aspects of gender equality. For instance, at home prenatal medical care may redress women's disadvantage in health care but reinforces women's exclusion from public life, particularly in societies that are heavily gender segregated. Otto does not explain how her guidelines interact so as to identify and resolve these harms.
A New Approach
Fredman's four-dimensional model of substantive equality overcomes these limitations and is an ideal framework for monitoring the ICESCR. Her model pursues four overlapping dimensions: breaking the cycle of disadvantage; promoting respect for dignity and worth; participation; and accommodating difference by achieving structural change. 147 The first element, breaking the cycle of disadvantage, recognizes that individuals and groups have suffered because of their personal characteristics. To redress this imbalance, specific and positive measures are required, including temporary special measures. The second element addresses recognition harms such as harassment, prejudice, stereotypes, stigmas, negative cultural attitudes, indignity, and humiliation. Third, the participation dimension requires inclusion of women in all public, private, political, and social decision-making processes. Fourth, the structural dimension requires institutions to change rather than individuals.
This model draws together and synthesizes the factors that the CESCR refers to in the General Comment on Equality and the General Comment on Non-Discrimination. It is not a definition but is specifically designed to be an evaluative tool to ''assist in modifying laws, policies and practices to better achieve substantive equality. '' 148 146. Otto, supra note 6 at 44, 49. 147. Fredman, Discrimination Law, supra note 9 at 27-29. 148. Sandra Fredman, ''Substantive Equality Revisited'' (2016) 14:3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 712 at 712.
As Fredman explains, ''the aim of the multi-dimensional approach is . . . an evaluative one, to provide a set of criteria to determine whether a law, policy, practice or institution is likely to fulfill the right to equality and points to ways in which they should be reformed better to do so.'' 149 It is sophisticated but ''user-friendly,'' which is crucial given the budget and time constraints of the CESCR. Unlike previous proposals, Fredman's model can mediate tensions between facets of gender equality. Framing substantive equality in terms of dimensions ''focuses on the interaction and synergies'' between different elements ''rather than asserting a pre-established lexical priority,'' 150 and when there are conflicts ''the aim is to look for . . . compromise, rather than suggesting that substantive equality pursue one of the aims at the cost of obliterating the others.'' 151 For instance, using this framework highlights how conditional cash transfers provided to women in poverty can address economic disadvantage but perpetuate misrecognition harms that women in poverty need incentives to provide education and health care to their children and that women are primary caregivers. 152 Achieving substantive equality and synergy between the four dimensions requires consultation with women in poverty. Transformative equality points towards unconditional cash transfers coupled with structural investment in public services.
It is important to acknowledge that the four dimensions, especially the participation dimension, can result in pluralistic and diverging perspectives on how to remedy violations of women's socio-economic rights. For instance, women may have different opinions on conditional cash transfers and how best to tackle poverty. Fredman's four-dimensional model of transformative equality acknowledges and gives space to engage with women's differences and, at the same time, gives the CESCR tools to mediate and harmonize differing perspectives. Her model of substantive equality has been highly influential. It has been adopted by UN Women in their latest flagship report, 153 and it is implicitly being relied upon by the CESCR and other UN treaty bodies. 154 Integrating Substantive Equality into the Monitoring of the ICESCR The four-dimensional model of equality can enrich the established standards and can function as an independent tool to ensure a comprehensive approach to monitoring the ICESCR. Linking ''maximum available resources/progressive realization'' and Fredman's substantive equality ensures that the development and allocation of resources and benchmarks and indicators promote women's equality. For instance, a substantive equality lens-particularly the participation dimension-ensures that women have a voice in setting progressive realization standards to ensure their needs are not overlooked. The CESCR can call attention to the need for gender sensitive budgets and macro-economic policies. The four-dimensional model of equality becomes a crucial facet of core obligations. This connection stresses the immediacy of taking all appropriate measures to achieve gender equality. Drawing on the CEDAW Committee, the CESCR can hold the state to account for immediately developing a national plan and implementation strategy that is based on substantive equality.
To ensure that the ICESCR identifies all of the ways women's human rights are violated, the four-dimensional model can be applied as an independent monitoring tool. It can shine a bright spotlight on the relationship between gender and socioeconomic rights. The dimensions and the interaction between them can comprehensively identify breaches of Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR. It can help ensure that the CESCR does not have any blind spots. It can direct the CESCR to examine women's rights-inter alia, to food, water, housing, and education-from four different dimensions: disadvantage, recognition, participation, and structural. For instance, in the Concluding Observations for Kenya and Namibia, the CESCR expressed concern about the high drop-out rates of children from school. Applying the equality monitoring tool requires the CESCR to consider: (1) how the impact of direct or indirect school fees and domestic responsibilities negatively impacts girls' right to education (disadvantage dimension); (2) how do the attitudes of teachers and parents reinforce stereotypes; do girls experience violence to, from, and at school (recognition dimension); (3) do schools have high-quality and culturally sensitive sanitation facilities for girls (structural dimension); and (4) has the state consulted with women and girls, including the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups (participation dimension)? 155 For Canada, the CESCR can highlight that efforts to address socio-economic disadvantage of Indigenous peoples need to be sensitive to inter-group differences. Indigenous women in Canada are among the most vulnerable groups in Canadian society. 156 The CESCR can recommend that Canada be cognizant of this disadvantaged position and ensure that all programs specifically address the nexus of gender and Indigenous status (recognition dimension). In a similar vein, the CESCR's discussion of land rights issues and harmful cultural practices in Namibia is almost entirely gender neutral. Using an independent equality monitoring tool, the CESCR can encourage the state to undertake awareness-raising programs targeted at traditional leaders on women's rights to inheritance and ownership and gender equality (recognition element) and facilitate dialogue between traditional leaders and women's organizations to promote the internal reform of customary laws and harmful cultural practices (participation element). The CESCR can then draw on the typology of duties to classify the nature of the steps that the state should take. Removing gender discriminatory provisions in the Indian Act in Canada is an obligation to respect, and directing police officers to patrol the route girls take to school in Kenya is an obligation to protect; women's facilitating dialogue on women's land rights in Namibia is an obligation to fulfil. 157 The proposed independent framework provides the analytical richness necessary to complement the typology of duties and give meaningful content to the reasonableness standard. Adopting Fredman's framework as an independent monitoring tool does raise questions about its application. States may resist using a more transformative or substantive concept of equality in monitoring the ICESCR. International human rights law walks a fine line between evolving to critically hold states to account for the violations of human rights and being deferential to states so as to ensure that they continue to participate in this voluntary accountability system. It is impossible to predict the reception of future developments, but the past developments of equality in the ICESCR give room to hope. The CESCR has clarified that the ICESCR is premised on substantive equality. 158 States have not rejected this interpretation, suggesting that a robust equality monitoring tool based on transformative equality will not be perceived as illegitimate. Furthermore and perhaps most importantly, a sophisticated and nuanced monitoring tool for gender equality and socio-economic rights fulfils the central aims of the CESCR-to ensure that the ICESCR is fully implemented. 159 By critically evaluating the state's efforts, the CESCR can engage in a more constructive dialogue with the state and provide more persuasive and finely tuned recommendations. Even if the state expresses some concern or trepidation about an independent monitoring tool for equality, the Concluding Observations and individual communications that use this tool allow for the CESCR to comprehensively assess women's socio-economic rights. This can empower domestic civil society organizations to put political and legal pressure on the state to take further measures to implement women's socio-economic rights.
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